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This contribution addresses the fundamental critique in Dinar et al. [1992, Theory and
Decision 32] on the use of game theory in river basin management: People are reluctant
to monetary transfers unrelated to water prices and game theoretic solutions impose a
computational burden. For the bilateral alternating-oﬀers model, a single optimization
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property rights result from exploiting the Second Welfare Theorem. Both issues are
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1. Introduction
The international community has come to recognize that fresh water is scarce,
witness the declarations at the Dublin Conference in 1992, the UN conference
Johannesburg 2002 and the tri-annual World Water Forums starting in 1997. It is
generally felt that the problem is not so much physical scarcity, but ineﬃcient use
and vested interests, in particular in case of the world’s many international rivers. In
some regions, ﬂooding and pollution pose serious threats, whereas in water stressed
regions, lack of agreement on how to share river waters and underground aquifers
are a serious source of potentially violent conﬂict.a
International water law, i.e., the Helsinki Rules of 1966 and the UN Conven-
tion on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses of
1997, does not recognize claims by upstream countries of owing the water caught on
its territory (absolute territorial sovereignty), conﬁscating headwaters by geopolitics
aSee e.g. UNESCO’s initiative “PC → CP From Potential Conﬂict to Cooperative Potential”,
http://webworld.unesco.org/water/wwap/pccp/cd/pccp publications.html
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or downstream nation’s claims of “historical rights” (unlimited territorial integrity),
see e.g., Ambec and Sprumont [2002]. Rather, international law states that the
nations involved should mutually agree on sharing the river through negotiations,
but it is left in the middle to what extend unilateral decisions can be made in the
absence of agreement. Such negotiations are often deadlocked, because almost all
governments in water stressed regions became aware of the water issues after having
experienced serious shortages of water and a simple reshuﬄing of water is perceived
as a “zero sum” game where giving up water is regarded as unacceptable. Unless
politics either deepen or broaden the water agenda, the situation is most likely to
stay put or might even deteriorate ending in conﬂict.
Coalition formation, the division of gains within coalitions and unilateral deci-
sions prior to the negotiations, so-called threats, traditionally belong to the realm of
game theory, which is also recognized by global institutions involved in river basin
management such as the World Bank, e.g., Carraro et al. [2005a, b]. These refer-
ences contain an extensive overview of the many documented studies in economics
and game theory addressing the water issue. However, these surveys also recognize
that there are only three applications of formal negotiation theory in which nego-
tiation procedures are explicitly modelled: Rausser and Simon [1992], Thoyer et al.
[2001] and Simon et al. [2001].
Although it is eminent that game theory oﬀers a methodology to address water
issues, the game theoretic profession did not seem to respond to the critique in
Dinar et al. [1992]: stakeholders and policy makers are reluctant to game-theoretic
transfers that are not related to water prices and, second, game theoretic solutions
impose a huge computational burden upon the applied modeler. The computational
burden in water issues arises because the physical economic problem has to be trans-
formed into the so-called “utility-space”, represented by the characteristic function
form, before any of the game theoretic concepts can be applied and, then, requires
a translation back into the original physical formulation. Also the computation of
game theoretic concepts in utility space is computationally diﬃcult. This criticism
still stands today.b
The ﬁrst critique goes beyond the lack of water prices. Since most existing inter-
national treaties, such as the Jordan-Israeli Peace Accords of 1994, are formulated
in terms of minimal transboundary ﬂows, water quality and ﬁnancial transfers,
this hints at that the framing of negotiation theory should be preferably close to
physical variables and notions understood by negotiation parties. Roemer [1988]
was among the ﬁrst to demonstrate how our understanding of two axiomatic bar-
gaining solutions, including the one proposed in Nash [1950], beneﬁts from taking
physical reality as the primitive.
Recent theoretical work by Houba [2005, 2007] for the alternating-oﬀers model
in Rubinstein [1982] provides a promising way to eﬀectively deal with the critique in
bPersonal communication with Professor Dinar during Game Theory Practice 2006.
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Dinar et al. [1992]. The bilateral case seems restrictive, but extends to multilateral
negotiations requiring unanimity among all parties. The innovations are twofold.
First, the equilibrium proposals in the alternating-oﬀers model, which form a
ﬁxed point problem in terms of the physical variables, can be solved directly as the
optimum of a single optimization program for which excellent software is available.c
Of course, every ﬁxed point problem f(x) = x can be reformulated as minimization
of (f(x)− x)2 that is minimized at every ﬁxed point x of the function f . However,
even for relatively small problems such procedure is known to be numerically cum-
bersome and might not produce any solution at all. The innovation in Houba [2005,
2007] is a diﬀerent reformulation that does allow for a robust numerical implemen-
tation. Furthermore, this method is computationally superior to methods relying on
truncating the model’s inﬁnite horizon, which is the approach in Rausser and Simon
[1992], Thoyer et al. [2001] and Simon et al. [2001] to circumvent the ﬁxed-point
problem. The objective of the single program is the same asymmetric Nash prod-
uct as ﬁrst reported in Binmore et al. [1986] for instantaneously fast negotiations
and this insight therefore extends to time-consuming or sluggish negotiations. The
bargaining weights provide a theoretical measure for bargaining power in sluggish
negotiations.
Second, this single program generates the player-dependent Pareto-eﬃcient pro-
posals. Therefore, the Second Welfare Theorem applies: Every Pareto eﬃcient allo-
cation can be regarded as a Walrasian equilibrium with Walrasian equilibrium prices
and suitable ﬁnancial transfers. This provides a sound underpinning of the game
theoretic solution in terms of water prices. Moreover, for every equilibrium pro-
posals, these Walrasian equilibrium prices coincide with the shadow prices in the
optimal solution of the single program and these prices are automatically generated
by the optimization software. The suitable ﬁnancial transfers are equal to the diﬀer-
ence in monetary value of the disagreement situation and the situation arising from
agreement, both evaluated against the Walrasian equilibrium prices. These trans-
fers can be interpreted as transfers of property rights. This interpretation is well
understood in Walrasian or applied general equilibrium (AGE) models, but novel
to game theory. AGE modelling is popular in applied economics and formulated in
physical variables that are close to the policy makers’ concerns and understanding.
The AGE framework is ﬂexible to accommodate sectors or regions in and across
economies as well as extensions involving uncertainty and dynamics, see e.g., Gins-
burgh and Keyzer [2002]. Therefore, this framework is of relevance in modelling
water related problems, as will be demonstrated for the bilateral version of the
river basin management model proposed in Ambec and Sprumont [2002]. Finally,
this reinterpretation of Pareto eﬃciency assumes non-transferable utility in dealing
with the negotiation problem instead of the more restrictive transferable utility.
This paper discusses the relevance of the results obtained for exchange economies
in Houba [2005 and 2007] in dealing with the fundamental critique in Dinar et al.
cFor example, GAMS is popular in applied economics, see www.gams.com
December 19, 2008 17:58 WSPC/151-IGTR 00193
260 H. Houba
[1992]. First, the results for exchange economies are surveyed in Sec. 2. Then,
production is added in the subsequent section. The Second Welfare Theorem, Wal-
rasian equilibrium prices and transfers of property rights are discussed in Sec. 4. The
bilateral version of the river basin model in Ambec and Sprumont [2002] in Sec. 5
serves as an illustration of the type of insights available for river basin management.
Directions for future research are delegated to the ﬁnal section.
2. Alternating Oﬀers and the Single Program
The alternating-oﬀers model in Rubinstein [1982] is formulated in terms of the divi-
sion of a single dollar. In this model, two negotiators take turns in proposing how to
divide the dollar until either an agreement ends the negotiations or they perpetu-
ally disagree. Under certain assumptions on time preferences (including discounting
future payoﬀs), this model admits a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) in
strategies that are stationary: Whenever a player proposes, this player always pro-
poses the same identity-dependent SPE proposal that makes the responding player
indiﬀerent between immediately accepting this SPE proposal or the continuation
SPE payoﬀ in which agreement is postponed for an additional round. This speciﬁes
a ﬁxed point problem that uniquely characterizes each player’s SPE proposal, see
for a survey e.g., Muthoo [1999] and Houba and Bolt [2002].
The alternating-oﬀers model also allows for an interpretation of negotiations
over an inﬁnite stream of single dollars with discounting under everlasting station-
ary contracts, as pioneered by Fernandez and Glazer [1991] and Haller and Holden
[1990] for wage bargaining. Recently, Houba and Wen [2006] point out that the
Pareto frontier under an inﬁnite stream of dollars and heterogeneous time prefer-
ences is supported by nonstationary contracts in which the impatient player obtains
zero in the long run. Such contracts seem too unrealistic and the economic modeler
has to impose justiﬁable restrictions upon the feasible divisions of such streams.
Stationary contracts represent just one of many choices and such contracts impose
a constant division over time that are by default Pareto ineﬃcient.
For river basin management, the interpretation in terms of an everlasting stream
of surpluses is appropriate, because rivers typically are renewable resources that are
exploited by its users over time. Reservoirs such as lakes, dams, cisterns or aquifers
are of relevance in river basin management and these require the introduction of
stock variables that link subsequent economies. However, we discuss such variables
only in Remark 2 in Sec. 5. Even in the presence of stock variables, stationary
contracts seem appropriate because many international agreements specify minimal
annual river ﬂows or cost sharing of annual operation and maintenance costs of
operating installed infrastructure. Although the framework is ﬂexible enough to
also handle nonstationary contracts, such contracts are brieﬂy discussed in Remark
1 in this section. In river basin management, initial endowments or property rights
are typically ill-deﬁned. In Sec. 5, we address the origin of these initial endowments
in such situations and, until then, we assume these are given.
December 19, 2008 17:58 WSPC/151-IGTR 00193
Computing Alternating Oﬀers and Water Prices in Bilateral River Basin Management 261
To establish notation, we consider an extension of the alternating-oﬀers model in
Rubinstein [1982] in which each of two agents discounts his per-period utility from
a sequence of consumption bundles in an inﬁnite stream of exchange economies
(without stocks). The exchange economy consists of two agents, indexed i = 1, 2,
called countries. The economy has n ≥ 2 commodities, strictly monotonic and
concave utility functions ui : Rn+ → R, i = 1, 2, a vector of initial endowments
ωi ∈ Rn+ for country i and total endowments ω = ω1+ω2 > 0.d A feasible allocation
is denoted as z = (z1, z2), z1, z2 ∈ Rn+, such that z1 + z2 ≤ ω. We assume that
(ω1, ω2) is Pareto ineﬃcient meaning that the bargaining problem is essential.
The feasibility constraint is better known as the aggregate commodity balance
and, whenever embedded in the single program, its shadow prices will play an impor-
tant role in the application of the Second Welfare Theorem discussed in Sec. 4. In
river basin management, it includes the so-calledwater balances that are determined
by the hydrological experts, see e.g., Albersen et al. [2003].
In the alternating-oﬀers model, time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ N. The fea-
sible allocation in period t is denoted as zt = (z1,t, z2,t) and endowments are con-
stant over time. The subject of the negotiations is a feasible allocation z = (z1, z2)
that should be understood as an everlasting, binding and stationary contract, i.e.,{
(z1,τ , z2,τ )
}∞
τ=T
with zi,τ = zi for both i and period t = T being the ﬁrst period
that the contract is implemented. In every period t ∈ N prior to agreement, each
country consumes zi,t = ωi. This means that country i’s disagreement utility is
given by di = ui(ωi), i = 1, 2. Country i’s utility from T ≥ 0 periods of disagree-
ment followed by agreement on z = (z1, z2) is given by
(1− δTi )di + δTi ui(zi),
where δi ∈ (0, 1) is country i’s discount factor. Furthermore, each constraint is
binding.
The negotiations proceed as follows: At t odd, country 1 proposes the feasible
allocation and, then, country 2 accepts or rejects. Accept ends the negotiations. If
rejected, then each country i consumes ωi before the negotiations move to the next
(even) round. At t even, the countries’ roles are reversed. The equilibrium concept
is SPE.
This extended alternating-oﬀers model also admits a unique SPE in station-
ary strategies, denoted as SSPE, in which the proposing player makes the same
identity-dependent SSPE proposal that makes the responding player indiﬀerent
between immediately accepting this SSPE proposal or the SSPE continuation in
which agreement is postponed for one more round. The country-dependent SSPE
allocations are denoted as x = (x1, x2), respectively, y = (y1, y2), for country 1
and 2. Then, accept allocation y is a best response for country 1 if and only if
dWe could allow for ω1 + ω2 ≤ ω that would describe cases where cumulative property rights
over several underdeveloped resources are less than is physically feasible. For example, the Israeli-
Jordan Peace Treaty of 1994 further develops the excess seasonal ﬂows of the Yarmuck River.
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u1(y1) ≥ (1− δ1)d1 + δ1u1(x1). Similarly, accept x is a best response for country 2
if and only if u2(x2) ≥ (1 − δ2)d2 + δ2u2(y2). Taking these equilibrium conditions
and the feasibility constraints into account, we have that any pair of SSPE alloca-
tions (x, y) simultaneously solves the following pair of convex programs as a ﬁxed
point:
x = argmax
z
u1(z1), (1)
s.t. z1 + z2 ≤ ω, u2(z2) ≥ (1− δ2)d2 + δ2u2(y2),
y = argmax
z
u2(z2), (2)
s.t. z1 + z2 ≤ ω, u1(z1) ≥ (1− δ1)d1 + δ1u1(x1),
where y2, respectively, x1 are exogenous in (1) and (2). Both x and y are Pareto
eﬃcient, see e.g., Houba and Bolt [2002]. Numerical implementation of this ﬁxed
point problem is computationally diﬃcult.
Of greater signiﬁcance therefore is the equivalence between any ﬁxed point (x, y)
of (1)–(2) and the solution to a single convex program, as ﬁrst established in Houba
[2007]. The equivalence is based upon the observation that any pair of SSPE allo-
cations, the proposed allocations x and y have the same asymmetric Nash product
associated with the bargaining weight α = ln δ2/(ln δ1 + ln δ2) for country 1. To see
this, note that
(u1(x1)− d1)α(u2(x2)− d2)1−α = δ1−α2 (u1(x1)− d1)α(u2(y2)− d2)1−α
and
(u1(y1)− d1)α(u2(y2)− d2)1−α = δα1 (u1(x1)− d1)α(u2(y2)− d2)1−α,
where δln δ21 = e
(ln δ1)·ln δ2 = δln δ12 implies that δ
α
1 = δ
1−α
2 . The asymmetric Nash
product is the objective function in the single program and its constraints are
obtained by combining the constraints in (1) and (2). However, a minor modiﬁcation
is needed, because the endogeniety of both y2 and x1 in each second inequality
constraint in (1) and (2) would violate the convexity of the program. The convexity
can be restored by introducing the additional variables si, i = 1, 2, replacing the
utility functions u1(x1) and u2(y2) in these constraints and the Nash product at
the costs of adding the additional constraints s2 ≤ u2(y2) and s1 ≤ u1(x1). Then,
the single convex program is given by
max
s≥d;x,y
(s1 − d1)α(s2 − d2)1−α, (3)
s.t.
s1 ≤ u1(x1)
s2 ≤ u2(y2)
(1 − δ1)d1 + δ1s1 ≤ u1(y1),
(1 − δ2)d2 + δ2s2 ≤ u2(x2),
x1 + x2 ≤ ω, (px)
y1 + y2 ≤ ω, (py)
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where px and py denote vectors of shadow prices. The following result states the
equivalence of the ﬁxed point (1) and (2) with program (3), which is the main result
in Houba [2007].
Proposition 1. (s∗1, s
∗
2, x
∗, y∗) is a solution of (3) if and only if (x, y) = (x∗, y∗)
is a pair of SSPE allocations to (1)–(2). The SSPE proposals x∗ and y∗ are Pareto
eﬃcient and, in the optimum, all constraints in (3) are binding.
Remark 1. Reinterpretation of the n commodities in (3) can represent nonstation-
ary contracts. Suppose the k-th component represents consumption of, say, water
or money at period k. Then, the contract distinguishes consumption of a single
commodity in n diﬀerent periods. A normalized and constant stream of this single
commodity would correspond to ωk = 1. Discounted utility over these n periods
can be captured by introducing some per-period utility function uˆi : R+ → R
and redeﬁning the utility function ui(zi) as
∑n
k=1 δ
k
i uˆi(z
i
k). This would also allow
for restrictions on the contract space through additional constraints. For example,
stationarity imposes zik = z
i
1 for all k, or limiting the growth of country i’s con-
sumption over time to a maximum of λ · 100 percent imposes zik+1 ≤ (1 + λ)zik for
all k. Many of such restrictions preserve the convexity of the program.
Since the program is convex, the Maximum Theorem implies that the shadow
prices px and py are nonnegative. Program (3) lends itself for implementation in
many of the optimization packages available today, such as e.g., GAMS. Since this
program is convex, these packages oﬀer robust computational algorithms designed
to eﬃciently compute an accurate numerical approximation of the unique optimum.
This almost exact numerical solution is superior to approximation of the ﬁxed
point of (1)–(2) through a T -period ﬁnite horizon truncation that involves solving
a sequence of T single programs of n variables and n linear constraints being either
(1) or (2). Rausser and Simon [1992], Thoyer et al. [2001] and Simon et al. [2003]
assume a random proposer at the ﬁnal bargaining round that eliminates the deadline
eﬀect and speeds up the convergence.
The single program states the formula for the Nash bargaining solution for all
parameter values δ1 and δ2 in a modiﬁed exchange economy of “double” size. It
also generalizes the well-known result in Binmore et al. [1986] for instantaneous
negotiations to time-consuming sluggish negotiations. Instantaneous negotiations
correspond to taking the limit of vanishing time between bargaining rounds. For-
mally, let ∆ > 0 denote the time between any two subsequent bargaining rounds
and consider discount factors equal to δ∆1 and δ
∆
2 . Vanishing time means taking the
limit ∆ goes to 0, i.e., lim∆→0 δ∆1 = lim∆→0 δ
∆
2 = 1. Then, instantaneous negoti-
ations correspond to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and feature x = y.
Therefore, these can be implemented by less variables and constraints and solved as
max
z
(u1(z1)− d1)α(u2(z2)− d2)1−α, s.t. z1 + z2 ≤ ω. (4)
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So, the additional computational costs, in terms of additional variables and con-
straints, of solving (3) for sluggish negotiations instead of (4) for instantaneous
negotiations amounts to n+2 variables and n+4 constraints, of which n are linear.
2.1. The bargaining problem in utility representation
Houba [2005] establishes similar results for convex bargaining problems in utility
representation. This is theoretically relevant, because every bilateral negotiation
problem that can be transformed into such convex bargaining problem is also solv-
able as a single convex program. Furthermore, it also provides valuable insights for
non-convex bargaining problems.
Formally, a bargaining problem in utility representation is denoted as the pair
(S, d) with S ∈ R2 the nonempty, compact set of feasible utility pairs and d ∈ S the
disagreement point. The curve si = fi(sj), i, j = 1, 2, i = j, describes the Pareto
frontier of S.
Any pair (s∗1, s
∗
2) of SSPE utilities simultaneously solves the following pair of
programs as a ﬁxed point:
s∗1 = argmax
s≥d
s1, s.t. s1 ≤ f1(s2), s2 ≥ (1 − δ2)d2 + δ2s∗2, (5)
s∗2 = argmax
s≥d
s2, s.t. s2 ≤ f2(s1), s1 ≥ (1 − δ1)d1 + δ1s∗1. (6)
Each program implies that the proposing country maximizes his own utility among
the set of feasible and acceptable utility pairs. In each optimum, both constraints
are binding. Houba [2005] establishes the following result for convex bargaining
problems (S, d):
Proposition 2. Let S be a convex set. Then, (s∗1, s
∗
2) is the unique pair of SSPE
utilities of (5)–(6) if and only if
(s∗1, s
∗
2) = argmax
s≥d
(s1 − d1)α(s2 − d2)1−α, (7)
s.t. s1 ≤ f1((1− δ2)d2 + δ2s2),
s2 ≤ f2((1− δ1)d1 + δ1s1).
This proposition partly extends to the class of bargaining problems in util-
ity representation that are strongly comprehensive or “non-convex” as in Herrero
[1989]. Then, program (7) always yields a pair of SSPE allocations, because in the
optimum both constraints are binding. However, the reverse may not hold as Her-
rero [1989] shows: Uniqueness of the pair of SSPE utilities (s∗1, s
∗
2) may break down
and multiple non-stationary SPE strategies may exist as well. The Nash product
associated to diﬀerent pairs of SSPE utility pairs (s∗1, s
∗
2) are also diﬀerent and may
be less than the maximal attainable Nash product. For instantaneous negotiations,
the (limit) pair of SSPE utilities (s∗1, s
∗
2) in program (7) coincides with the maximal
Nash product as axiomatized in Kaneko [1980]. The limit set of all SSPE utilities
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of (5)–(6) is axiomatized in Herrero [1989]. What is needed for uniqueness in (non-
stationary) SPE strategies is the stronger uniqueness in ﬁxed points of (5)–(6).
3. Production Economies
The results for exchange economies might seem of limited interest for applied eco-
nomics. The aim of this and later sections is to show the merits in applications. In
this section, we address how to incorporate production.
Extending the exchange economy to allow for production activities is concep-
tually straightforward, see e.g. Varian [1984]. Production plans require inputs from
the economy in order to produce outputs. These are represented in a single vector
q ∈ Rn with positive and negative elements, where positive (negative) elements
represent outputs (inputs). Production technologies are often represented by the
production set Q ⊂ Rn of all technologically feasible input-output combinations.
Often, production sets are represented by transformation functions. In our case,
transformation functions more naturally ﬁt the optimization framework. The func-
tion F : Rn → R is a transformation function representing Q if q ∈ Q if and only
if F (q) ≤ 0. Furthermore, F (q) = 0 means q is eﬃcient. The possibility of inaction
and no free lunch translate into F (0) = 0. The technology is convex if the function
F is quasi-convex. Otherwise, the technology is called nonconvex.
Since we later discuss bilateral river basin management in which the economy
of each riparian country involves water related production, we assume that water
related production is carried out by many small producers that are mainly active in
one country. For explanatory reasons, we aggregate all producers in one country by
assuming one production set for each country.e So, each country exclusively controls
some production technology and country i’s production plan is a vector Fi(qi) ≤ 0.
The subject of the negotiations becomes a feasible allocation z = (z1, z2, q1, q2)
such that
z1, z2 ∈ Rn+, F1(q1) ≤ 0, F2(q2) ≤ 0 and z1 + z2 ≤ ω + q1 + q2,
where negative components of either q1 or q2 lower the amount of that particular
good available for consumption. The aggregate commodity balance implies that the
demand for each good is at most equal to its supply. It is standard to have a single
vector per producer instead of having the demand for inputs on the left-hand side.
In case of convex production technologies, we immediately have that the bar-
gaining problem in utility representation is also convex, see e.g., Roemer [1988],
and, hence, the equivalence stated in Proposition 2 immediately applies. Also in
terms of the economic environment, the equivalence between the ﬁxed point prob-
lem and program (3) remains in tact, where the single program remains convex.
Including (convex) production per country requires the following modiﬁcations to
eIf not, we would have the index set Ji of producers in country i and Fj(qj) ≤ 0 for every j ∈ Ji.
In the text, we assume Ji = {i}.
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the alternating-oﬀers model, where we add an additional superscript x and y to the
production plans to distinguish between country 1’s and 2’s proposal. The modi-
ﬁcations to program (1) imply rewriting the commodity balance and adding both
transformation functions such that the modiﬁed program includes the following
constraints:
x1 + x2 ≤ ω + qx,1 + qx,2, F1(qx,1) ≤ 0 and F2(qx,2) ≤ 0.
Similar, the modiﬁed program (2) includes the following constraints:
y1 + y2 ≤ ω + qy,1 + qy,2, F1(qy,1) ≤ 0 and F2(qy,2) ≤ 0.
These modiﬁcations must also be made to obtain the modiﬁed program (3), which
we omit.
Nonconvex production technologies can be implemented in the same manner.
However, such technologies cause a breakdown of the convexity of the modiﬁed
program (3), because such technologies are known to give rise to nonconvex bar-
gaining problem in utility representation. As argued for the utility representation
in Sec. 2, the theoretical results only partly extend. Its counterpart for program (3)
with nonconvex production reads: The maximum of the modiﬁed single program
(3) corresponds to one of possibly multiple SSPE strategies. The SSPE speciﬁed by
this program is special in that it has the largest Nash product.
The modiﬁed program (3) with production can also be implemented in opti-
mization software. Under convex production technologies, the software returns the
unique optimum. However, for nonconvex programs it is fundamentally unclear
whether a local or global optimum is found, even though most packages oﬀer
robust algorithms for such problems. Although this is a fundamental problem of
any numeric optimization, the numerical solution returned, whether it is the global
or a local optimum, has properties that are consistent with SSPE behavior.
4. Market Prices and Property Rights
This paper is motivated by the fundamental critique in Dinar et al. [1992], who
report on the diﬃculties arising from applying cooperative game theory to several
small-scale water issues. They state: “Clearly, the potential for additional income
due to cooperation is higher when side payments are possible. However, the sound-
ness of such transfers with no a prior reference to the price per unit of water may be
questioned, especially considering the general resentment of farmers to adopt side
payments as a policy.” Since side payments or transfers are advocated by (coopera-
tive) game theory as the universal remedy towards cooperation, the game theoretic
society should treat this critique very seriously.
In this section, we discuss the merits of the Second Welfare Theorem in dealing
with this fundamental issue. Since (cooperative) game theory developed
autonomously from microeconomics, it does not refer to nor does it exploit the
implications of the Second Welfare Theorem. For that reason, we discuss these
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implications in detail before turning our attention to bilateral river basin manage-
ment in the next section.
The Second Welfare Theorem for economies with production states: Any Pareto
eﬃcient allocation is attainable as a price quasi-equilibrium or Walrasian equilib-
rium with transfers, see e.g., Varian [1984], Mas-Colell et al. [1995] and Ginsburgh
and Keyzer [2002]. Mas-Colell et al. [1995] show that this theorem holds under con-
vex and locally nonsatiated preferences and convex production technologies. The
transfers can be achieved through many appropriate physical reallocations of the ini-
tial endowments or through ﬁnancial lump-sum transfers evaluated against the
Walrasian equilibrium prices. In terms of a Walrasian economy, these transfers take
place before price-taking behavior by all agents on the economy’s markets. Then, by
the law of supply and demand, the Walrasian equilibrium prices support the Pareto
eﬃcient allocation under consideration. These Walrasian equilibrium prices can also
be obtained as the shadow prices of a welfare program. The objective function in
program (3) is the Nash social welfare function as axiomatized in Kaneko [1980].
The implication to river basin management is clear: Any Pareto eﬃcient allocation
can be reinterpreted in terms of lump-sum ﬁnancial transfers and supporting water
prices.
In order to focus the discussion, consider country 1’s SSPE proposal (x1, x2,
qx,1, qx,2) with the vector of shadow prices px as obtained by the modiﬁed
program (3). The allocation (x1, x2, qx,1, qx,2) is feasible and, being a SSPE
proposal, is Pareto eﬃcient. Therefore, the shadow prices px can be regarded as
the Walrasian equilibrium prices and these prices clear all the markets: aggregate
demand x1 + x2 equals aggregate (net) supply ω + qx,1 + qx,2.
Valued against px, country i’s allocated consumption xi is worth px ·xi and
can be regarded as country i’s expenditure on all goods. This expenditure is ﬁnanced
from this country’s market income obtained from selling against px its endowments
ωi and its produce Fi(qi) ≤ 0 that are worth px ·ωi+px ·qi. In general, a country’s
allocated (or allowed) expenditure and its market income will not be equal and this
means that either a country is allowed to expend more than it earns, or less. This
diﬀerence can be interpreted as country i’s implicitly received lump-sum subsidy, or
tax levied on this country. Formally, in country 1’s SSPE proposal, country i receives
the net lump-sum transfer T xi = p
x · xi − px ·ωi− px · qi, which is a subsidy if
positive and a tax if negative. Before-tax market income is equal to px ·ωi+px ·qi
and after-tax market income is mi = px ·ωi +px · qi−T xi = px ·xi. Note that
there is a balanced budget for the ﬁctitious tax authority. This follows directly from
the aggregate commodity balance that appears as px · (x1 + x2 − qx,1 − qx,2 − ω)
in the Lagrangian of the optimization problem and this term is equal to 0 in the
optimum.
In the Walrasian equilibrium all trade is voluntary and the markets respect
property rights in the sense that, valued against the Walrasian equilibrium prices,
each consumer’s expenditure is equal to his (non-taxed) market income: T xi = 0 in
a Walrasian equilibrium. In any SSPE agreement, each country’s expenditure and
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after-tax income satisﬁes the same property, but from moving from before-tax to
after-tax market income a change in property rights occurs valued T xi that is most
likely diﬀerent from zero. In the context of negotiations, the countries are rational
and any agreement is reached on a voluntary basis. So, any such voluntary agreed
upon contract implies agreement upon a redistribution of property rights.
As mentioned, the Pareto eﬃcient allocation (x1, x2, qx,1, qx,2) can be
thought of as arising from a Walrasian economy in which all parties act as price
takers. Country i behaving as a price-taking consumer facing market prices px and
having after-tax income mi = px · xi solves
xi = argmax
xi≥0
ui(xi), s.t. px · xi ≤ mi,
where we take uniqueness of the maximizer for granted. So, country i acting as a
price-taking consumer voluntarily purchases xi such that ∇ui(xi) = px, where
∇ui denotes the gradient of ui in case of diﬀerentiability. Monotonicity of the utility
function guarantees px · xi = mi. This latter condition should also be fulﬁlled in
the ﬁrst-order conditions of the modiﬁed program (3). As mentioned, for convex
programs the shadow prices px (and py) are nonnegative. This result generalizes to
economies with non-convex production, because then the monotonicity of the utility
functions guarantees the non-negativity of px and py through px = ∇ui(xi) ≥ 0
and py = ∇ui(yi) ≥ 0.
Similar to the Robinson Crusoe economy, country i is also producer i. Country
i behaving as a price-taking producer facing market prices px solves
qx,i = argmax
qx,i
px · qx,i, s.t. Fi(qx,i) ≤ 0,
where we once more take uniqueness for granted.f Similar as before, country i
as a price-taking producer voluntarily chooses the production plan qi such that
∇Fi(qx,i) = px, which is also fulﬁlled by the ﬁrst-order conditions of the modiﬁed
program (3). Under convex production, ﬁrm i always makes a nonnegative proﬁt
that accrues to consumer i’s before-tax market income. However, nonnegative prof-
its are not automatically ensured under non-convexities. Then, we need to modify
the proﬁt maximization problem taking into account a lump-sum producer’s sub-
sidy Si = −px · qx,i ≥ 0 received by producer i to favour the producer’s decision
towards qx,i instead of inaction at qx,i = 0. Of course, proper accounting requires
that producers’s subsidies and consumers’ subsidies are counted just once. The pro-
ducer subsidy Si ensures that consumer i receives a net proﬁt of at least 0 from
operating the production plant, but this consumer pays for Si through T
x
i , which
requires a minor adjustment of the national accounts.
To summarize, since each SSPE proposal is Pareto eﬃcient it can be supported
by Walrasian equilibrium prices as an immediate consequence of the Second Welfare
fUnder constant returns to scale, the Walrasian equilibrium prices are such that the ﬁrms make
zero proﬁt and then a set of maximizers exists.
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Theorem. The associated Walrasian equilibrium prices are the shadow prices of
the modiﬁed program (3) and these resolve the lack of (water) prices. Although
shadow prices are implicitly present in transforming the physical economy into
the (often transferable) utility representation in game theoretic applications, their
presence seems to be ignored. Also the richer interpretation of agreements in terms
of reallocation of property rights remains behind a veil when taking the utility
representation as the primitive of the analysis. In negotiations, parties beneﬁt from
voluntarily agreeing upon a redistribution of property rights, even in the absence
of such rights as will be clear from the next section.
The Walrasian equilibrium prices suggest the possibility to decentralize all con-
sumer and producer decisions through markets and suitable taxation. In river basin
management, introducing water markets is often advocated as a solution to inade-
quate water management. Of course, whether it is advisable to do so should depend
upon whether or not these agents have market power to manipulate market prices,
which is a separate matter and outside the realm of the Walrasian equilibrium
model.
5. Bilateral River Basin Management
Thus far, we established that program (3) can be implemented in economies with
production and that SSPE proposals can be interpreted as Walrasian equilibria. In
this section, we illustrate the potentials of this insight to bilateral river basin man-
agement in a two-country version of the model proposed in Ambec and Sprumont
[2002].
Consider a river that runs through two countries, where country 1 lies upstream
of country 2 and all water users within the same country are aggregated as a single
consumer. A more detailed model would allow for explicit production and water
users that diﬀer in their spatial location, representing diﬀerent regions or cities,
and diﬀer in their use, such as agriculture, industrial and domestic. The territory of
country i, i = 1, 2, captures ei > 0 of water that is available for use. The subject of
the negotiations concerns the allocation of water and an explicit ﬁnancial transfer.
Therefore, each country derives utility from consuming water and from holding
money. Country i’s utility from consuming zi of water and the possibly negative
transfer ti is given by ui(zi, ti) = bi(zi) + ti, where bi is monotonically increasing,
homogenous (bi(0) = 0), diﬀerentiable and strictly concave. The function bi can also
be regarded as an implicitly described production technology that can be separated
as described in Sec. 4 at the cost of an additional variable and constraint. Following
Ambec and Sprumont [2002], money is transferred utility meaning that the two-
country economy does not have initial holdings of money. Total endowments are
ω = (e1, e2, 0).
In terms of economic goods, the model distinguishes between good 1 representing
water that is physically located in country 1, good 2 representing water located in
country 2 and good 3 representing money. In Walrasian economies, each consumer
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expresses a demand for each of the available goods, but in case of rivers country
1 cannot consume good 2 and country 2 cannot consume good 1. To minimize on
subscripts and superscripts, we continue denoting country i’s consumption of good
i simply as zi. So, in terms of Sec. 4, we have z1 = (z1, 0, t1) and z2 = (0, z2, t2).
Since water disposed of by country 1 ﬂows downhill and transforms good 1
into good 2 we should see the river as a giant production process governed by
physical processes. In the model under consideration, the river accumulates e2 on
country 2’s territory and, therefore, the river’s production of downhill water between
“locations” 1 and 2 takes place on country 1’s territory. So, it is country 1 that
produces good 2 with good 1 as input. Although some countries spend a signiﬁcant
proportion of the gross national income on pumping water uphill, such as Israel
and the Kingdom of Jordan, we refrain from pumping as in Ambec and Sprumont
[2002]. We only note that pumping should also be treated as a production process.
In the present setup, country 2 cannot produce good 1.
With respect to production of good 2, country 1 produces q2 from input q1 and,
under costless transformation, we have q1 + q2 ≤ 0 and q1 ≤ 0, which implies the
production vector q1 = (q1, q2, t) and the convex production technology F1(q1) ≤
max {q1 + q2, q1, t} ≤ 0.g The aggregate commodity balance is given by
z1 ≤ e1 + q1, (p1)
z2 ≤ e2 + q2, (p2)
t1 + t2 ≤ 0, (p3)
(8)
where p1, p2 and p3 refer to the shadow prices for the three goods. Consumption
of z1 ≤ e1 by country 1 and eﬃciency in production implies q2 ≤ −q1 ≤ e1 − z1.
Substitution yields the mathematically equivalent feasibility constraints in Ambec
and Sprumont [2002]:
z1 ≤ e1, (p1)
z2 ≤ e2 + e1 − z1, (p2)
t1 + t2 ≤ 0, (p3)
(9)
Then, the subject of the negotiations is reduced to (z1, z2, t1, t2). The allocation
should be extended to also include q1 and q2 in applications where the hydrological
part of the model is provided by hydrologists.
5.1. The disagreement point
An essential ingredient of any bargaining problem is the disagreement point. For
water issues, there is some modelling freedom in the choice of such point. An obvious
choice is a disagreement point based upon property rights according to international
law. An alternative choice for the disagreement point would be to assumes that this
point is based upon the countries’ unilateral decisions concerning water issues. We
discuss both alternatives.
gFor completeness, q2 = (qˆ1, qˆ2, tˆ) ∈ Q2 if and only if F2(q2) = max
˘
qˆ1, qˆ2, tˆ
¯ ≤ 0.
December 19, 2008 17:58 WSPC/151-IGTR 00193
Computing Alternating Oﬀers and Water Prices in Bilateral River Basin Management 271
Suppose in modeling water issues we opt for a disagreement point based upon
international law. As Ambec and Sprumont [2002] argue, international law is
ambiguous and they discuss two conﬂicting doctrines. One of these doctrines is
absolute territorial sovereignty and it assigns ei as the property rights for country i
and the river’s production technology to country 1. This would imply ω1 = (e1, 0, 0),
ω2 = (0, e2, 0) and the disagreement point d = (b1(e1), b2(e2)). This point is always
feasible, because
b1(e1) + b2(e2) ≤ max
z1∈[0,e1]
b1(z1) + b2(e1 + e2 − z1). (10)
In order to have an essential bargaining problem, the inequality has to be strict.
Then, the players negotiate for an agreement within the set IR of Fig. 1.
The second doctrine is unlimited territorial integrity and it assigns incompatible
property rights to the countries, namely e1 to country 1 and e1 + e2 to country 2.
Also, the river’s production technology accrues to country 2. This would translate
into ω1 = (e1, 0, 0), ω2 = (0, e1 + e2, 0) and the unattainable aspiration point
(b1(e1), b2(e1 + e2)), because
b1(e1) + b2(e1 + e2) > max
z1∈[0,e1]
b1(z1) + b2(e1 + e2 − z1). (11)
In case both countries are fully committed to these “virtual” aspiration levels, then
it is most likely that the negotiations remain deadlocked with disagreement as the
only outcome according to e.g. Crawford [1982] and Muthoo [1992]. However, when
parties are not committed, Mariotti and Villar [2005] propose the (cooperative)
Nash rationing solution to negotiate concessions with respect to the infeasible claims
in bankruptcy problems. Applied to bilateral river basin management, the countries
negotiate concessions within the set RP of Fig. 1. Obviously, country 2 prefers
Nash rationing based upon unlimited territorial integrity, whereas country 1 prefers


u1
u2
IR
RP
b1(e1)
b2(e2)
b2(e1 + e2) 












Fig. 1. Absolute territorial sovereignty implies negotiations over the set IR, whereas unlimited
territorial sovereignty implies negotiations over the set RP below u1 + u2 ≤ 1.
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negotiations based upon absolute territorial sovereignty. This explains the often
ﬁerce disputes over these two doctrines commonly observed in reality.
As an alternative modelling approach that is also close to reality, we may assume
that each country takes unilateral decisions concerning water issues in the absence
of bilateral river basin management. In terms of noncooperative bargaining the-
ory, the disagreement point is endogenous. Several theoretical models are available,
see e.g. Busch and Wen [1995]. These bargaining models also assume the model
under consideration as the disagreement game in which both countries take uni-
lateral decisions. Under SSPE behavior and the impossibility of commitment to
disagreement actions prior to the negotiations, the disagreement point coincides
with a Nash equilibrium, which is (zi, ti) = (ei, 0), i = 1, 2, in our case. This Nash
equilibrium coincides with absolute territorial sovereignty. Although international
law suggests that countries should mutually agree on Pareto improvements through
negotiations, this law seems to lack a doctrine how to treat unilateral decisions in
absence of agreement.
5.2. The Second Welfare Theorem and water prices
The purpose of discussing this particular model is to arrive at water prices, water
trade and transfers of property rights through ﬁnancial money transfers. The inter-
esting case assumes the nontrivial case in which the disagreement point corresponds
to absolute territorial sovereignty: d = (b1(e1), b2(e2)). Application of the modiﬁed
program (3) yields the single convex program
max
s≥d;(x1,x2,qx1 ,qx2 ,tx1 ,tx2),(y1,y2,qy1 ,qy2 ,ty1 ,ty2)
(s1 − d1)α(s2 − d2)1−α, (12)
s.t.
s1 ≤ b1(x1) + tx1 (µ1)
s2 ≤ b2(y2) + ty2 (µ2)
(1 − δ1)d1 + δ1s1 ≤ b1(y1) + ty1 , (λ1)
(1 − δ2)d2 + δ2s2 ≤ b2(x2) + tx2 , (λ2)
x1 ≤ e1 + qx1 , (px1)
x2 ≤ e2 + qx2 , (px2)
tx1 + tx2 ≤ 0, (px3)
y1 ≤ e1 + qy1 , (py1)
y2 ≤ e2 + qy2 , (py2)
ty1 + t
y
2 ≤ 0, (py3)
qx1 + q
x
2 ≤ 0, (γx)
qy1 + q
y
2 ≤ 0, (γy)
where all Greek symbols between brackets denote shadow prices. As in Sec. 4, we
only discuss country 1’s SSPE proposal (x1, x2, qx1 , q
x
2 , t
x
1 , t
x
2). The part of the ﬁrst-
order conditions involving the partial derivatives of these six variables (maintaining
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the stated order) are given by
µ1b
′
1(x1)− px1 = 0,
λ2b
′
2(x2)− px2 = 0,
px1 − γx = 0,
px2 − γx = 0,
µ1 − px3 = 0,
λ2 − px3 = 0.
Solving these equations yields
px1 = p
x
2 = p
x
3b
′
1(x1) = p
x
3b
′
2(x2) > 0, (13)
because utility is strictly increasing in money and, therefore, px3 > 0. Due to speci-
ﬁcities of the model, we obtain the special case of a uniform water price for all loca-
tions. From (13) we observe that only relative prices matter and we may take money
as the numeraire by dividing all shadow prices by px3 , where we denote the normal-
ized (uniform) water price as pxw = px1/px3 . Assuming that the bargaining problem is
essential, i.e., Pareto improvements exist as depicted in Fig. 1, the total gains from
bilateral river basin management are maximized if the upstream country is willing
to trade some of its water for money. Since also all shadow prices are positive, we
must have that all constraints are binding, including eﬃcient river production. So,
qx1 = x1 − e1 < 0 and qx2 = −qx1 > 0 implies x2 = e1 + e2 − x1 > e2. Furthermore,
b′1(x1) = b
′
2(x2) in (13) implies that the joint surplus b1(x1) + b2(x2) is maximized
in this SSPE proposal and, hence, x1 coincides with the unique maximizer of the
right-hand side of (11), as could be expected. Finally, tx1 + t
x
2 = 0 and q
x
1 + q
x
2 = 0
imply that aggregate spending equals aggregate income pxw(x1 + x2) = p
x
w(e1 + e2).
According to the Second Welfare Theorem, country i’s before-tax income pxwei
and its expenditure or after-tax income is equal to mxi ≡ pxwxi + txi . Acting as
a price-taking consumer, country i spends its income on water consumption and
monetary liquidity by solving:
(xi, txi ) ∈ argmaxzi,ti ui(zi, ti), s.t. p
x
wzi + ti ≤ mxi , (14)
which yields ∂ui(xi,ti)∂xi = b
′
i(xi) = p
x
w and
∂ui(xi,ti)
∂ti
= 1. Note that b′i(xi) is also
country i’s marginal rate of substitution between water and money and it is equal
to the relative price pxw/1. The monotonic preferences imply the budget constraint
is binding. Country 1 receives the amount of money tx1 = −tx2 > 0 for its delivery of
e1−x1 to country 2. This implies a unit price of water of (e1−x1)/t1 that is unrelated
to marginal costs and beneﬁts. Note that it does not matter whether ti represents
money or some consumption good from which the countries obtain utility. Since the
SSPE proposal is individually rational, we obtain that txi ≥ bi(ei) − bi(xi) > 0 for
both i = 1, 2. Summation of these inequalities shows a nonempty range of transfers
that are feasible, because tx1+t
x
2 = 0 and b1(e1)+b2(e2)−b1(x1)−b2(x2) is negative.
Next, consider producer 1 with its constant-returns-of-scale river production
technology. Producer 1’s proﬁt under price-taking is equal to 0, because he buys
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input q1 = x1−e1 < 0 against price pxw and sells exactly this amount at exactly the
same price to country 2. We refer to Albersen et al. [2003] for non-trivial ﬁnancial
accounts derived from shadow pricing and non-convex physical processes.
Although money is usually regarded as a special economic good, it is just one of
the goods in the economy, also according to the Second Welfare Theorem. This the-
orem provides an interpretation of the allocation (x1, x2, qx1 , q
x
2 , t
x
1 , t
x
2) in terms of
market trade (or marginal cost/beneﬁt pricing) against the price vector (pxw, p
x
w, 1)
and a redistribution of property rights equal to T xi = p
x
wxi + 1 · txi − pxwei, being
the diﬀerence between expenditure and before-tax income. Whether T xi is posi-
tive or negative is an empirical matter. This redistributive eﬀect consists of the
combined value of net trade in water pxw(xi − ei) and the net trade in money
1 · (txi − 0) that is opposite in sign. The negotiated outcome combines two eﬀects:
redistribution of wealth and wealth improving trade, which is incorporated in the
before-tax market income. Even though the initial rights in river basin manage-
ment might be ill-deﬁned, both countries agree on a redistribution of the implicitly
deﬁned initial property rights by establishing “ﬁnal” property rights associated with
(x1, x2, qx1 , q
x
2 , t
x
1 , t
x
2). Although the shadow prices can be thought of to represent
Walrasian equilibrium prices as if established by water markets that are governed
by the law of supply and demand, this interpretation assumes the countries refrain
from exercising market power.
In general, the Second Welfare Theorem deals with non-transferable utility
instead of transferable utility or money, as e.g., in Ambec and Sprumont [2002].
For the bilateral case, the transferable utility value of cooperation, denoted as
v(1, 2), is equal to the right-hand side of (10). The Pareto frontier is described by
fi((1−δj)dj+δjsj) = v(1, 2)−(1−δj)dj−δjsj . Then, direct application of program
(2) yields
max
s1,s2
(s1 − d1)α(s2 − d2)1−α,
s.t.
s1 ≤ v(1, 2)− (1− δ2)d2 − δ2s2,
s2 ≤ v(1, 2)− (1− δ1)d1 − δ1s1.
In this program, any reference to prices and marginal beneﬁts has vanished from the
model description. In this simple case, this crucial information can be retrieved from
(10), but for less transparent applications a holistic approach in physical variables
as in e.g. Roemer [1988] yields more information to policy makers.
Finally, Ambec and Sprumont [2002] show that there is a unique Pareto eﬃcient
utility vector consistent with both doctrines: In Fig. 1 it is the intersection of the
line u1 + u2 = 1 and the line through the disagreement point and the aspriration
point. These utilities are related to the downstream incremental distribution that
assigns utility d1 to country 1 and v(1, 2) − d1 > d2 to country 2. This solution
coincides with the SSPE outcome (in utilities) in the alternating-oﬀers model with
disagreement point (b1(e1), b2(e2)) and bargaining weight α = 0, or in terms of the
primitives either δ1 = 0 or δ2 = 1. This indicates that it is highly unlikely that this
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axiomatic solution will prevail in an alternating-oﬀers perspective. Note that even
at α = 0 the Second Welfare Theorem applies.
We conclude this section with a remark on stock variables.
Remark 2. Optimal river basin management includes the optimal release and
recharge of lakes and dams as reservoirs of water. Reservoirs would introduce stock
variables to the model. A reservoir can also be seen as a production process that
produces “future” water from “current” water and it can be represented as before by
a transformation function F (q) ≤ 0. As an illustration, reinterpret z1, respectively,
z2 as water at present and in the future, say the wet and dry season. Then, the
reservoir produces future water q2 from present water q1 as input and, under absence
of evaporation, we have q1 + q2 ≤ 0 and q1 ≤ 0 as before. Then q1 is the end stock
of period 1 and q2 the initial stock at period 2.
6. Concluding Remark
This contribution deals with the fundamental critique in Dinar et al. [1992] that
alienates game theory from the language and concerns of policy makers and stake-
holders: Easy to implement solutions that are based upon common notions of
water pricing; and insight in the gains and losses for every stakeholder from policy
reforms toward eﬃcient river basin management. For bilateral negotiations modeled
as alternating-oﬀers, as pioneered in Rubinstein [1982], a powerful computational
innovation in a physical representation of real-world issues is available that simulta-
neously allows for an interpretation of water prices as Walrasian equilibrium prices,
which is a direct consequence of the Second Welfare Theorem. Unfortunately, the
utility representation in game theory washes away any notion of water prices from
the physical model, as illustrated in Sec. 5. The physical model can be regarded as
the popular AGE framework that allows for further diﬀerentiation of water users,
water related production and consumption goods by time (within the hydrological
cycle), by space and uncertainty about extreme weather conditions (droughts and
ﬂoodings), although the latter would assume the existence of contingent contracts
and a discrete number of events.
Identifying water prices as Walrasian equilibrium prices should not be mistaken
as naively suggesting to decentralize decisions through water markets. For that to
be the best policy recommendation, it should be made clear ﬁrst that all partic-
ipants on these markets do not posses signiﬁcant market power. For river basin
management, also the role of governments is crucial even in case these do not
trade themselves on the water market, because upstream countries might initiate
development of plans for, say, expanding the area under irrigation aﬀecting future
downstream ﬂows.
Although this paper identiﬁes a promising route for further developing tools
for water policy research, the bilateral case is just a ﬁrst step that generalizes to
multilateral river basin management negotiations requiring unanimity. This is the
case in negotiations on interstate river compacts between US states, where each
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state has an option to appeal to the US Supreme Court, see Heintzelman [2006].
Future research should be directed to deal with coalition formation among coun-
tries or among diﬀerent stakeholders within and across countries. Also the issue of
regulating water markets when some parties have market power is a relevant issue.
As in all areas of economic policy, lobbying is a matter of related interest. The
bilateral model in Houba [2005] captures such negotiations in which the probability
of success in lobbying means a higher probability to propose during the negotia-
tions. This model reduces to the standard alternating-oﬀers model after a suitable
transformation and, therefore, the approach advocated in this contribution also
applies.
In river basin management, meteorological and hydrological data are often con-
sidered as classiﬁed by the national authorities involved. Also, water users often tap
illegally into the river or aquifer, or keep secret about the waste they dilute into
the river. Incomplete and imperfect information is therefore an important research
theme. The standard alternating-oﬀers model has proven itself in these extensions,
see e.g., Muthoo [1999]. This hints at good prospects for extending the equilibrium
analysis to such extensions in the context of bilateral river basin management.
The issue of imperfect contracts should also be addressed in future work, but dif-
ferently from stationary versus nonstationary contracts as in Houba and Wen [2006]
and discussed in Remark 1. With imperfect contracts within each period, govern-
ments should also be given the right incentives to comply or prosecute oﬀenders in
order to preserve the treaty. Suppose incentive constraints can be expressed similar
as the transformation functions Fi, then these can be added to program (12) as the
“incentive functions” Ii(x1, x2) ≤ 0 and Ii(y1, y2) ≤ 0, i = 1, 2. Although convexity
and feasibility of this modiﬁed program (12) become an issue, this program is still
applicable to compute SSPE proposals. Then, the commodity balances still provide
marginal values for water, which have an interpretation as water prices. There-
fore, program (12) addresses the critique in Dinar et al. [1992] even for imperfect
contracts.
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